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A quasi-historical approach, which studies perceptions of 
contemporary subjects regarding the development of existing 
related inventions, was used to gain a conceptual 
organization of inventiveness. Five experiments required 
subjects to rank four types of di'shes (plate, bowl, cup, and 
glass) in the perceived order of natural development, rate 
the likelihood that the dish ~ypes originated from different 
sources, rate the likelihood' tha-t;:· changes betwe'en dish pairs 
was motivated by food type, and identify heuristics used to 
move between dish pairs. Subject~ strongly agreed in their 
perceptions of the invention'process, suggesting that: 1) 
people think of related inventions as' linked in sequential 
pathways, progressing from simple to.comp~ex artifacts, 2) 
organic origins are more plausible,than ~rianimate origins 
for simple inventions, 3) the function an artifact is to 
serve is seen as a motivating factor behind its invention, 
and 4) the heuristics used in changes between two related 
inventions are readily recognizable. 
3 
Natural Pathways in the Perception of Invention Sequence 
The study of the process of invention has become of 
increasing interest (Jones, 1970; Simon, 1981; Weber & 
Dixon, 1989; Weber & Perkins, 1989). At least two pragmatic 
reasons exist for the increased interest: We need better 
ways of conceptualizing and teaching about invention, and 
any knowledge gained through research on how to become a 
better inventor may be applied to increase the quality and 
the quantity of known invenfions .. With the rise in 
competition between the United States and other countries to 
present original ideas to the world market, there is a 
growing need for us to increase our production of patentable 
inventions. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office defines 
patentable inventions as new and useful and nonobvious (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1985) . Given the recent attention 
to national productivity, the study of invention is now both 
necessary and timely in order to create a "bridge or 
interface between the worlds of technology and cognitive 
science" (Weber & Dixon, 1989). 
Psychologists in particular are entering into the 
investigation of invention. One reason for thi~ Bpecific 
interest is that the study pf invention offers a. very 
applicable and concrete way to study two other important 
psychological processes: creativity and problem-solving. 
In the past, cognitive psychology focused on issues such as 
creativity and problem-solving in order to research the act 
of creating something new and useful (Weisberg, 1986) ._ 
Historically, however, researchers have had difficulties in 
pursuing these routes of studying creative mental processes, 
and they have often cons.idered highly artificial problems. 
The study of invention helps us to overcome those 
difficulties by 'supplying important real-world problems. 
Difficulti~s in the Creativity and 
Problem-Solving Literature 
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One difficulty encountered throughout the literature is 
that the term "creativity" is notoriously difficult to define 
(Weisberg, 1986) . The "genius" view of creativity is 
accepted by some. This view assumes that. a ~ery few creative 
persons exist who have extraordinary talents that spring 
inexplicably from them in great creative leaps. Another 
approach to defining creativity is the "no~hing new" view, 
espoused by John Watson (1968). This_definition involves the 
assumption that the~e truly is "nothing new under the sun," 
and that creative acts are "simply generalizations of one or 
more old ideas ~ that new ideas are simply random 
combinations of responses" (Watson, 1968). A more modern 
view is that "creative problem-so~ving involves a person's 
producing a novel response that solves the problem at hand 
(Weisberg, 1986). Due to this definitional difficulty, 
researchers investigating creativity and divergent problem-
solving seldom agree upon exactly what process they are 
studying. 
A second problem is the means by which researchers have 
trained people to think ~~~reative ways. The major 
training tactic has been "brainstorming" (Bouchard, 1971; 
Bouchard & Hare, 1970; Dillon, Graham, & Aidells, 1972; 
Dunnette, Campbell, & Jastaad, 1963; Osborn, 1953) . The 
brainstorming technique attempts to enhance creativity and 
problem-solving by stressing "copious ideation" and by 
withholding judgment until many ideas are produced (Osborn, 
1953) 0 This technique i'nvolves, the assumption that 
critical thought during idea generation decreases creative 
production. Contrary to this assumption, several studies 
indicate that when subjects evaluate and eliminate bad ideas 
during the generation process; they produce more high-
quality solutions than their brainstorming counterparts 
(Gerlach, Schutz, Baker, & Mazer, 1964; Johnson, Parrott, & 
Stratton, 1968; Weisskopf-_Joelson & Eliseo, 1961). These 
results address the need for methods of training people both 
to generate .a.rui to evaluate ideas to filter out the 
ridiculous and implausible in early stages of production. 
A third problem encountered in past research on 
creativity and problem-solving is low generalizability. For 
example, results from divergent thinking tasks (which 
encourage thought similar to free-association to generate as 
many ideas as possible, like brainstorming) and problem 
-solving tasks often have low generalizability to important 
problems. Mansfield and Busse (1981) showed that 
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performance on d_iverg.ent thinking tasks is unrelated to 
scientific creativity. In other words, the ~ost creative 
scientists are not_ the persons scoring highest on divergent 
thinking te'sts. 
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A fourth, and more gene~al, problem is that the methods 
used to teach creativity.and problem-solving are not 
consistent with research findings. To date, most of the 
teaching on invention and creativity is largely intuitive 
with little supporting data. For example, Osborn's (1953) 
brainstorming tehcnique.~s widely used in public schools and 
major corporations across the. UrS., ~~en though scientific 
studies show that brainstorming often results in the 
production of fewer high-quality ideas than more evaluative 
methods of idea generation (Weiss~opf-Joelson & ElJseo, 
1961) . Thus, in addition to teaching people to produce more 
ideas, we need to devi~e ways to teach people to become 
better critics of these ideas. Through systematic research, 
we may find more concrete.and generalizable principles for 
teaching creativity than those found previously in the 
literature. 1\pplicable heuristics (principles -helpful in 
generating ideas), analagous _to' those in the problem-solving 
literature, may aid would~be inventor~ in better generating 
and evaluating their ideas. 
Recent Studies on Invention 
Historically, both psychologists and non-psychologists 
have st~died invention in the context of design (Alexander, 
1964; Jones, 1970; Norman, 198S; Simon, 1981). Design is 
largely the act of improving upon'already existing 
inventions. This definition differs 
from the "new, useful, and nonobvious" definition of 
invention cited earlier. However, for the,purpose of this 
__ paper, invention will be defined so as to include design as 
well _as the creation of original artifacts (Weber & Dixon, 
'• 
1989; Weber & Perkins, 1989). · 
In the psychological literature related to invention, 
recent studies include: a) the- investigation of historical 
cases of inventions, such as .the telephone (Gorman & 
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Carlson, 1989; Langley, Simon, Bradshaw, & Zytkow, 198~); b) 
the use of architectural inventions of Neolithic peoples to 
understand their geometrical ·knowledge (Cowan, 1988); and c) 
the outlining of interes~ing-methods for applying heurist~cs 
to invent artifacts and ideas (Weber & Dixo~, 1989; Weber, 
Dixon, & Llorente, 1991; Weber, Moder & Solie, 1990; Weber_& 
Perkins, 1989) . Whlle these studies a::re rich in concept and 
thought-provoking information, they lack systematic study of 
their generated hypotheses and heuristics.· Clearly, one 
' ' > 
step in discovering the menta~ processes underlying the 
creative act of inventing is to test contemporary subjects' 
perceptions of some simple-heuristics which may aid in 
inventing. 
Key Concepts to Understanding Invention 
In this study, a.quasi-historical -approach to 
understanding inventions will be used.' Such an approach to 
the study of invention equips t.he' psychologist with an 
extensive database created by the tracks of past inventive 
minds (Weber & Dixon, 1989; Weber, Dixon, .. ,& Llorente, 1991; 
Weber & Perkins, 1989). Instead of using retrospective 
accounts of established inventors, which would require the 
questionable assumption that an important invention springs 
from a single mind, the scientist working ~rom a quasi-
historical approach begins with a collection of known 
inventions. By using a family of simple artifacts, such as 
different types of dishware, to investigate fundamental 
changes along a given invention pathway, 'the researcher is 
able to use the accelerated products of·aggregate minds to . . 
understand possible heuristics that drive invention. The 
idea is that larger changes are easier to see than small 
changes. In q.ddition, when the heuris.tic processes that 
8 
drive an invention alon~ its pathway are found, they can add 
to the knowledge of a single inventor; that is, they become 
normative principles that·take residence in the mind of the 
individual inventor: 
Notice that within this approa~h, strong historical 
claims are D.Qt. being made. The historical record is too 
fragmented. Instead, a conceptual ordering is sought. The 
situation is analogous to that of Euclid, who collected 
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geometric truths and then attempted to systematize them. 
History was a useful guide, but it was the conceptual 
system, its organization and clarity, that was ultimately 
the goal. The same emphasis is present here. Whatever the 
actual history, if related inventions (such as different 
types of dishes) can be conceptually ordered, a way is 
provided for thinking systematically about an important 
class of inventions. We are all familiar with this process. 
It is the path from disorganized and unsystematic discovery 
to the coherent organization of knowledge in a textbook. 
The difference is that textbook organization is often the 
work of a single author. Here the goal is to determine more 
systematically the natural mental organization or path of a 
wide group of people. 
When using a quasi-historical approach to study inventior 
the following assumptions must be made: 
1. Everyone is an inventor at some level of 
sophistication. Invention is not a unique process 
experienced by only a few genius minds. Thus, we can study 
the perception of invention in the average person. 
2. The mental processes of people today are not 
fundamentally different tpan they were ten thousand years 
ago. Therefore, people today can make judgments about very 
old inventions. 
3. Judgments are easier to make than productions. This 
assumption is certainly true in areas such as music, where a 
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listener can be a very sophisticated critic yet may not be 
able to play an instrument at all. So, perhaps contemporary 
people can readily judge ~he order of steps between 
invention states and recognize candidate heuristics used in 
moving between the~e states, even for very old inventions. 
The reader must keep in mind that ordering steps and 
recognizing heuristics is qualitatively different form the 
act of inventing, which involves weeding out irrelevent 
factors and disregarding distractions in order to produce 
something new. 
In order to aid th~ reader in. understanding the link 
between contemporary subjects' perceptions about inventions 
and the actual historical record of known artifacts, two 
important concepts of the quasi-historical approach to 
studying invention, ftame description and gain analysis, are 
now discussed. 
Frame Description. A frame description is one method 
of generating discussion about an artifact· in order to 
better understand the invention and to proquce ideas for 
possible ''next steps" along the invention path~ay (Lenat, 
1978; Minsky, 1975; Weber, 1987; Weber & Dixon, 1989; Weber 
& Perkins, ~989) . · A frame de,cription consists of a 
representational framework 6f an object, action, or idea. 
This skeletal frame contains slots, o~ characteristics which 
define the object, such as attributes, relations, or 
11 
procedures. The values of the slots are instantiations of 
these defining characteri~~~~s. 
It may be useful for the reader io visualize a frame 
description as much like entries in. a bookkeeper's ledger. 
The title of the pag~ ·in the ledger, such as "Record of 
Expenses," is the idea to be described. The names of the 
rows, such as "Gasoline" or "Rent" are the slots. Instances 
of each slot may be entere~ as a date, an amount of money, 
or the name of the creditor to whom the money was paid. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Table 1 shows a frame description for a cup with a 
handle, one of the pieces of dishware used as a stimulus 
object in the present study. The slots are italicized words 
with the intitial letter capitalized, while the values are 
in lowercase letters. This frame description provides a 
good starting point for analyzing the invention of the cup. 
It is important to note that_ a frame description is 
only one of many possible ways to represent knowledge about 
an artifact. Other conceptual aids, such as Gorman and 
Carlson's (1989) "mental models", may also prove to be 
useful. They described a. mental model as i:m incomplete, 
unstable mental prototype "which-incorporates [the 
inventor's] assumptions about how a device might eventually 
work." While such underlying mental processes quite likely 
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do occur and are: highly interesting, the authors admit that 
mental models are often "hazy" and difficult to define. The 
' -
frame description, while possibly not as close as the mental 
model to the inv~ntor's actual conceptualization of an 
artifact, certainly has more clearly-defined boundaries 
within which historical, examples and anonymous, inventions 
' 
fit readily. - The mental models approach _requires detailed 
' ' 
knowledge of the lnventor's thought processes, a requirement 
that cannot be satisfied by most inventions. Thus, the 
frame description is a better fit for the analytical study 
of the very old, anonymous inventions studied in this paper. 
Two other interesting points are presented by Gorman 
and Carlson: 1) an inventor-might consider competing mental 
models to solve a problem arrd 2) "mental models can be 
nested within one another." When mental models are nested, 
the inventor may have "an ov.erall mental model of a device 
and mental models ... of components of that device." Frame 
descriptions of ~imilar inventions, too, can be compared by 
an inventor as to which best solves the problem at hand, 
which is most efficient, etc. They can be nested within one 
another or overL3.pped at one ·or more slots. Further 
.. 
discussion of how separate frame descriptions may be 
interrelated will be presented later in this paper. 
Gain analysis. Weber and Dixon (1989) used a 
historical approach to study the principles that drive 
inventions along·their pathways. They examined the pathway 
of the invention'of sewing by a means of gain analysis. 
Gain analysis involves: 
1. Identifying different states on a given invention 
path. Possible precursor states to an existing invention 
may be found by par.sing the invention i11to its components 
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and constructing a frame· analysis of the parts. A se.arch of 
the historical record for precursor inventions is then made 
to find artifacts which lend evidence that improvements were 
made to arrive at the existing invention. 
2. Examining the dif~erences between the invention and 
its. precursors through a frame analysis of each artifact. 
3. Arriving'at possible heuristics to bridge the 
differences between the inveQtion states. 
4. Generalizing the heuristics to 'different inventions. 
In the present study, a modified gain· analysis 
I < 
procedure will be used to investigate the perception of 
natural pathways between different states of an invention 
set, dishware. If subjects a~e able to perce~ve a pathway 
between different types of dishware in Experiment 1, then 
following experiments will look for possible heuristics to 
' ' 
' ' 
explain the move~ent ·f~om one dish type to· another. If such 
heuristics are deemed applicable by the subjects, then a 
discussion of the' possible mental processes underlying the 
use of the heuristics will follow. Generalization of the 
heuristics will b~ addressed through experimentation and 
discussion. 
Obdectives of the Present Study 
The continued usefulness after thousands of y~ars of 
I ' 
such basic inventions as' the wheel, the needle, and the 
knife underscores the potential importance of the mental 
processes involved in 'inventing them. The present study 
continues ·within :this context. The important invention-of 
I 
dishware will be ,compared· to the ~invention of digging tools. 
Dishware was chosen as a point of reference because of the 
practical importance and long his~ory of its use and 
because of the sfmplic-ity of changes in its invention 
' ' ' 
pathway. For example, when moving along a hypothetical 
' 
pathway from a plate to a bowl without handles, one may 
transform along a single dimension, depth (see Figure 1) . 
Basic digging tocils, too, undergo simple changes along their 
' - ' 
hypothetical invention pathway. Figure 2 shows that when 
moving from a square, shovel to a snow shovel, the most 
obvious change is that the width of the scoop increases. 
Other changes shown in t~e line drawing--such as the 
increased length,of the shaft,· the change ,in the shape of 
I 
the blade, and the increased width of the ,handle-~are also 
basic transformattons. 
'Insert Figure 1 about here 
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Insert Figure 2 about here 
In Experiment 1, variations in dishware (such as a cup, 
a bowl, a plate, .and a drinking glass) are ranked in the 
perceived order in which subjects believe the dish types to 
have been invented. A duplicate study involving variations 
in digging tools (such as a scoop without a handle, a spade, 
a square shovel, and a snow shove.l) is also run in order to 
generalize any o~servations of a possible natural order of 
developmental steps, or a natural pathway, betwBen similar 
inventions. It is important to note that the perception of 
order in sets of dishware and tools is NOT obvious to the 
examiner prior to the ex~eriment. Thus, the preselection of 
the dish and tool types presented was made without the 
intent of enhancing the obviousness of a particular 
ordering. 
Experiment 2 focuses on possible precursors to the dish 
types used in the first _experiment. Four precursors are 
considered. Subj~cts are asked to rate the likelihood of 
each dish type having sprung from four precurs~r categories: 
human body parts,, animal parts, plant parts, and inanimate 
structures. Experiment 3 looks at the plausibility of 
pathways between pairs of dishes (e.g., how likely was the 
move from a plate to a glass) and pairs of digging tools 
(e.g., how likely was the move from a square shovel to a 
16 
snow shovel) . The twelve possible pairs of the four dishes 
and the twelve p9ssible pairs of the four diggin~ to6ls used 
in Experiment 1 are rated as to thei~ plausibility that dish 
A came before dish B (or tool A came before tool B) in the 
historical record. These plausibility ratings are 
qualitatively compared to the expected results based on the 
rank orderings of the dish types and tool pairs in 
Experiment 1. Thus, if a plate was ranked before a glass in 
Experiment 1, one would expect the plausibility ratings in 
Experiment 3 to be higher for the dish pair "Plate to Glass" 
than fo~ i~s opp6site, "Glass to Plate." The dish and tool 
' 
pairs are also used ~n Experiments 4,and 5. 
Experiment 4 searches for motivating factors in the 
transformations between dish pairs (e.g., changes from a 
bowl to a cup wi~h a handle) . Subjects are asked to rate 
the likelihood that different food types (hot/cold, 
solid/liquid) stimulated the moves between dish pairs. 
Finally, Experim~nt 5 searches for the subjects' knowledge 
of the heuristics used in transforming dish A (e.g., a 
plate) to d~sh B ·(e.g., a bowl). The results from the 
dishware heur~stics are compared ijnd contrasted with the 
subjects' abilit~ to identify h~uristics used in 
transforming one digging tool (e.g., ~ spade) to another 
(e.g., a snow shovel). 
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Experiment 1: Perceived Pathways 
This experiment 'searches for evidence of people's 
perceptions of a'natura~ pathway betwe~n related invention 
states. The idea of a natural order for mental processes is 
not new to the field of'cognitive psychology (Barsalou & 
Sewell, 1985; Bo~er, Black & Turner, 1979; _Schank & Abelson, 
1977). Researchers investigating th~ representation of 
knowledge of routine actions, such as eating in a 
restaurant, have shown that s~ch actions are organized in 
memory in the form of scripts, or typical sequences (see 
Table 2). For example, Bower et al. (1979) found 
substantial agreement between_subjects on the order of 
action in familiar scenes. They alsq ·found· that subjects 
recall the more typical sequence df a scene over a scrambled 
f 
presentation sequence. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Scripts may:be conceptualized in a slightly different 
f 
manner using a frame analysis. Table 2 shows a frame 
., 
description of the restaurant script (Schank & Abelson, 
1977). The scenes involved~-entering, ordering, eating, and 
exiting--are represente~· as ~rocedure slots. Therefore, the 
values of the slots are the actions included in each scene. 
For example, in the "eating" scene the action values may be: 
a) cook gives foqd to waitress, b) waitress brings food to 
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customer, and c) . customer eats food. Note that this frame 
description is quite similar to the individual frame of the 
cup in Table 1, but the script frame has the added feature 
of seQuential values. 
Perhaps the~e is this element of sequence within the 
frame description of a single invention and/or between the 
' 
frame descriptio.ns of ·related inventions? Fo'r example, in 
the frame description of the cup in Table 1, are there 
sequential links between the instances of the slot labeled, 
,. 
Precursor Inyentfon~? One·coul~ argue that the cupped hand 
is a precursor of the half shell. The half shell then may 
lead to a bowl-shaped artifact.· After adding a handle, this 
hypothetical sequence of the invention pathway nears the 
present state of ;the cup. 
Likewise, ddes the entire frame for the cup fit within 
a natural order of the slot contents labeled Related 
Inventions? For !example, does the bowl precede the cup in 
this invention pa~hway, and/or is a drinking glass without a 
handle a precursor or a successor of the cup? If these 
related artifacts· were invented in some sequence, then we 
may assume that there was also a natural order to the 
cognitive processes involved in-modifying the cup and 
creating its related invention's. 
If there is some perceivable order to the processes 
underlying a path. of simple inventions, then subjects should 
be able to agree in rank ordering such artifacts as to which 
19 
came first, second, and so on. In Experiment 1, subjects 
are asked to rank .different types bf dishware in the order 
of perceived invention.· if a, natural pathway is perceived, 
then a particular dish should be ranked in one order more 
often than others. 
The obvious alternative to such a perceived natural 
pathway would be no ~rder, or'random changes between 
invention states. Here we would expect each dish to appear 
in each position roughly the same.number of times. Such a 
random distribution of the dish types would lead to the 
conclusion that all dishes have completely independent 
origins, at least as perceived by contemporary subjects. In 
order to generalize the findings for or against natural 
pathways, results of the dishware rankfngs are compared and 
contrasted to the subjects' rankings of four types of 
digging tools in the perceived order of invention.· 
Method 
Subjects. Subjects, were recruited from an introductory 
psychology course at Oklahoma 'State University. Thirty-six 
subjects for the dishware rankings and thirty-eight subjects 
for the diggi~g tools ~ankings were given extra.credit for 
their participation in this study. Other means of obtaining 
extra credit were availaple. 
Procedure. In the dishware study, subjects were given 
a pencil and paper task which showed four dish types (a 
plate, a bowl, a cup.with a handle, and a drinking glass 
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shape) in a randomized order. They were instructed to rank 
the four artifacts in order of the relative time of 
' ' 
invention (see Appendix M, and they were asked to give 
brief explanations for their rankings. The purpose in 
collecting the explanations was to obtain a qualitative 
understanding of ho'w people view transitions from one 
invention-state to another. The explanations were 
qualitatively classified by two different judges and then 
analyzed. A percentage of agreement between the two judges 
was calculated for each of the"classifications. 
' I ' -
To produce generality, 'another study employed a very 
different class of stimulus ·materials. Four types of 
digging tools (a scoop witho:u't a handle, a spade, a square 
shovel, and a snow shovel) were also presented as stimuli to 
a separate group of subjects (see Appendix B). 
Results and Discussion. Table 3 shows that· most 
subjects ranked the plate as the 'first of the four dish 
types invented; with the, bowl as second, th~ glass as third, 
and the cup as fourth .. The apparent agreement between 
subjects on this pattern of dishware development is quite 
striking and strongly· supports the hypothesis that subjects 
are able to perceive natural~pa~hw~ys between related 
artifacts. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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The reader will notice that the ra~kings for the plate 
and the bowl are somewhat similar. This similarity may be 
due to the greater availability of natu=ally occurring 
models for the plate and the bowl than for the more 
derivative cup and glass. Too, both the plate and bowl are 
quite simple inventions with the only major structural 
difference betwe~n them being depth. Thus, if subjects 
ranked the four dish types on the basis of simplicity or 
most similar to naturally occurring for~s, then the plate 
and the bowl would likely vie for the first two positions. 
In the digging tool study, subjects also exhibited an 
overall preference for one pathway between the tools, with 
the scoop first, the spade second, the square shoVel third, 
and the snow shovel fourth (see Table 4) . Here the 
differences between each of the rankings show that overall 
the subjects clearly agreed upon the ordering of the tools. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Subjects' responses to the four questions regarding the 
reasons given for ranking t~e ~ishware and the digging tools 
in the orders shown above (see Appendixes A and B) were 
qualitatively analyzed. Many of the subjects explained 
their ranking by using a heu~istic of moving from the most 
simple invention towards the most complex. For example, a 
plate is obviously the most simple instance of the dish 
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types with only two dimensions and no handle. A bowl adds 
the dimension of depth, ~ gl~ss increases the depth and 
decreases the width, and a cup· changes the depth and width 
and adds a handle. A simlar pattern of "simple to complex" 
reasons was given for thS digging tools. Other reasons 
given for the rank orders include: adding parts or 
dimensions, increasing size, movi'ng from general to more 
specific functions, and incre~sing the efficiency of the 
invention In order to quantitatively analyze the 
subjects' reasoning behind the rankings, the first reason 
given by each subject as to why a particular invention was 
ranked in the first position was categorized by "type of 
reason" (see Tables 5 and 6); A second judge also 
categorized the response by type of reason, and the 
percentage of agreement between the two judges for the 
categories in the dishware study was at or above 75% for all 
categories, except for Most Specific (71% agreement) and 
Most Natural (60% agreement). In the digging tools study, 
the percentage of agreement between the two judges was at or 
above 85% for all categories~ ·except for Most Natural (71% 
agreement) . 
Insert Table 5 about here 
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Insert Table 6 about here 
In the dishware study, so~e of the responses within the 
categories of "Simpl'est" and "Flattest" appeared to overlap. 
For example, several subjects who gave simplicity as a 
reason for ranking the plate in the first position 
elaborated their response with the reasoning that the plate 
was the flattest dish type (e.g':, "It's basic. .just 
flat"). Other subjects gave similar responses, only in a 
reversed order (e.g., "It's just a flat object. .the 
simplest"). This finding lends further credence to the 
hypothesis that most people yiew the natural pathway of 
dishware as moving from simplicity to increasing complexity. 
However, the similar categories were not collapsed together 
because not all responses within one category were judged to 
be clear elaboration~ of another category.~ Thus, collapsing 
across such responses would possibly bias the date in favor 
of the "simplicity" hypothesis. 
An apparent overlap of some categories in the digging 
tool study was also found. Examples of the categories of 
"Most Primitive" (e.g., "It's crude"), "Simplest" (e.g., "It 
has nothing to it. . it is not as advanced as the others"), 
and "Most Natural" (e.g., "Most natural source at the time") 
all seem to be stating that the tool ranked first lacks 
complexity. Here again, though, these categories were not 
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combined to prevent any bias in the data. This finding 
shows, however, that the heuristic of moving from simple to 
' 
more complex artifacts along an invention pathway is 
generalizable to some pathways outside of the development of 
dishware. 
In order to test the null hypothesis that there were no 
significant differences between the frequency of responses 
in the type of reason given first, a chi-square analysis was 
performed in both studies. In the dishware study, there 
were significant differences in the distribution of the 
types of reasons, X~(6)=32.06, ~ < .01. A separate chi-
square was also performed on the first reason for digging 
tools, with x~(4)=15.95, ~ < .01. Here, too, there was a 
significant difference between the expected and observed 
frequencies of the different types of reasons (see Table 6) . 
Experiment 2: Origins 
The results of the previous experiment support the 
notion that there are recognizable natural pathways between 
invention states and that contemporary subjects are able to 
agree upon reasons for such natural order (e.g., the move 
from simplicity to complexity) . Given that information, the 
following question arises: Do contemporary people 
agreeupon the plausibility of an origin or a class of 
origins for related artifacts, such as dishware? 
The main purpose, although certainly not the only 
purpose, for the invention of dishware is-to contain 
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different substances. Johnson (1987) suggested that the 
idea of containment sprang from the observation of the human 
body's ability to contain. For example, our mouths can hold 
water or food, our bowels contain waste products, and our 
hands can hold solids and liquids. Other hypotheses are 
__ also possible. Containment as an idea could also have 
sprung from animal or plant parts as models, or from 
inanimate structures. For example, a.bowl may have its 
origins in a cupped hand, a broken shell, a curved leaf, or 
a puddle. 
The idea of viewing a biological analog as a plausible 
origin for an invention has been studied in a recent paper 
by Weber, Dixon, and Llorente (1991) . In that 
investigation, subjects were asked to rate how likely 
different types of hand tools developed from several 
different body parts/actions. Their results indicated that 
contemporary subjects were able to agree upon some pairings 
of given tools and biological metaphors (e.g., tweezers were 
judged to most likely have originated from a finger-to-thumb 
model). Other tools (e.g., brace/bit, screwdriver, and 
file) were rated across subjects as quite unlikely to have 
their origins in a biological metaphor. 
The following study looks at the possibility that 
people perceive precursors for modern dish types in human 
body parts, anim~l parts, plant parts, and/or inanimate 
structures. Moreover, it attempts to assess the most 
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plausible origins for each dish. According to Johnson's 
view, the most plausible origins should lie in the human 
body. An alternative hypothesis is that there are no 
differences between the plausibility ratings for the 
different classes ~f origins. 
Method 
Subjects. Subjects were recruited 'from an introductory 
' ' 
psychology course and were given ex~ra credit for their 
pa~ticipation in this study. ~hirty-eight subjects 
participated in Part A, and thirty-si~ subjects were 
involved in Part B. ' 
Design and ~rocedure. In Part A of this .exP,eriment, 
subjects were given a'pencil and paper task which presented 
in random order the sam~ fouF dish types ~hown in Experiment 
1 (see ~ppendix C) . For- each of the dish types, ,four 
,< 
categories of poss.~ble prec-ursors (e.g., human body parts, 
animal parts, pla~t ~arts, and inanimate forms) were given 
in a randomized. order. Thus, the four. dish types and the 
four origin categorie~ were all presented wi~~in-subjects. 
Participants were as~ed tq w~ite down as many instances of 
' 
possible precursors as t~ey cquld, think of fo~ each origin 
' ' 
category. The initial purpose of this part of the 
experiment was to obtain the 'single best instance df each 
category to use as astimulus in the ratin~ task in Part B. 
While such information was obtained and indeed utilized in 
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Part B, the frequency of responses in each origin category 
in Part A also seemed interesting. 
In Part B of this experiment, a separate set of 
subjects was presente~ a paper and pencil task involving the 
same four dish types in a randomized, within-subjects format 
(see Appendix D) . All subjects were also randomly presented 
with the "best instance" of each origin category for each 
dish type, as calculated by the frequency of a given 
response across subjects in Part A. 
The reader may notice that the "best instances" of 
origin categories were not identical across dish types. For 
example, when given the dish type of "plate," the possible 
forerunners give~ for each category were: hands (human body 
parts), rock (inanimate form),~ (plant part), and animal 
paws (animal body part). Yet· when given the dish type of 
"drinking glass," the best instances for each category were: 
hands (human body parts), rock (inanimate form), plant stem 
-
(plant part), and animal paws -(animal part). The difference 
in the best instances given for the plant parts makes common 
sense based on the shape of the dish type presented 
(e.g., a plant stem is more like the hollow cylinder of a 
drinking glass and a leaf can be flat like a plate) . 
Therefore, the experimenter chose to sacrifice some 
continuity in the presentation of best instances of origin 
categories across dish types in order to better answer the 
question of how likely a category of precursors (e.-g., plant 
parts) spurred the development of a class of inventions 
(e.g., dishware). Thus, the instances of each candidate 
origin category presented to subjects in Part B of this 
experiment vary slightly across the dish types. 
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Subjects were instructed to rate each of the possible 
forerunners as to how likely it carne before a given dish 
type in the historical record. A Leikert-type scale from 1 
-7 was used. A rating of ''1" indicated that a possible 
forerunner was deemed very UNlikely to be found in the 
historical record of the given dish type. A rating of "7" 
indicated that the object presented was judged to be a very 
LIKELY precursor in the development of the dish type. 
Results and Discussion. In Part A of this study, 
subjects gave more instances of the organic precursor 
categories (human, animal, and plant) than instances of 
inanimate and miscellaneous precursors. Figure 3 shows the 
mean frequency of responses for each dish type by origin 
category. Notice that the mean frequencies are higher for 
the organic origins (ranging from 1.0 to 1.7) than for the 
inanimate and miscellaneous origins (ranging from 0.5 to 
0.8) across all four dish types. This could be due to the 
difference in availability to memory of organic versus 
inanimate models; that is, people can more easily recall 
organically based structures that are similar to a dish type 
in form or function than they can recall inanimate 
structures. Another possible explanation for this result is 
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that subjects may have judged organic categories as more 
plausible precursors than_5n~nimate categories for the dish 
types, so they gave more instances of the former 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
A 4 x 5 (Dish x Origin) ANOVA with repeated measures 
on both factors was performed with Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections for departure f.ror:n symmetry. A significant Dish 
x Origin interaction effect was found; £ (7.22, 267.29) = 
2.33, R < .05. Due to this significant interaction, the 
main effect for Origin, £ (2.68, 99.04) = 17.57, R < .001, 
is not statistically interpretable, although it is 
definitely interesting. It suggests that the null 
hypothesis that subjects would give equal numbers of 
precursor instances across the origin categories is not 
supported. 
In order to compare differences in the mean frequency 
of response given for each of the origin categories, a 
Tukey's-HSD was performed. Table 7 shows the means for each 
cell (Dish Type/Origin Category) and indicates with an 
asterisk which cells were significantly different from one 
another at the q = .05 level. For example, in the first row 
the mean for the cell "Glas~/Plant Origin" is significantly 
different from the means for the cells "Cup/Human Origin," 
"Bowl/Inanimate Origin," "Plate/Miscellaneous Origin," etc. 
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Notice that out of all of the statistically significant 
differences between the cell means, all but one 
("Glass/Plant Origin" compared to "Cup/Human Origin") of the 
comparisons are between an organically based category 
(human, plant, or animal) and an inanimate or miscellaneous 
category. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
In Part B, a separate set of subjects rated how likely 
a given instance of an origin category (e.g., "a hand") was 
actually a precursor for each dish type. The best instances 
(or those responses given most frequently in Part A of this 
experiment) of four origin categories were presented as 
candidate precursors for each dish. The mean plausibility 
ratings for each dish type by category are shown in Figure 
4. In this study, there does not appear to be as clear cut 
a difference between responses to the organic (human, 
animal, and plant) categories and the in~nimate categories, 
as in Part A. Yet the overall plausiblity ratings for the 
inanimate category do appear to be slightly lower than 
overall ratings for the other three categories. It is 
unclear as to whether this indicates an actual preference to 
the idea that dishware most likely sprang from organic 
precursors or that these results merely indicate that the 
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instances of the inanimate category were not the best 
possible models of that .category. 
Insert figure 4 about here 
In Part B of this experiment, a 4 x 4 (Dish x Origin) 
ANOVA with repeated measures on both factors was performed 
with Greenhouse-Geisser corrections for departure from 
symmetry. A significant Dish x Origin interaction effect 
was found, E (3.78, 132.42) - 15.38, ~ < .01. Here again, 
the significant interaction effect renders the significant 
main effect for Origin, £. (2.25, "78.72.) =. 5.91, ~ < .01, 
uninterpretable. These results do suggest, however, 
that for particular dish type~ subjects rated certain 
candidate origin categories as more plausible precursors 
than other categories. 
In order to compare the means for each origin by dish 
type, a Tukey's-HSD was performed. Table 8 shows which 
cells were significantly different fro~ one another at the 
q = .05 level (as indicated by an asterisk). For example, 
in the first row the mean for the cell "Bowl/Animal Origin" 
•' 
is significantly different from t·he mea.ns for the cells 
"Plate/Inanimate Origin," "Plate/Animal Origin," "Bowl/Plant 
Origin," etc. 
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Insert Table 8 about here 
In the table, carats (~) indicate the statistically 
significant differences between cells with inanimate origins 
and cells with organic origins (plant, human, or animal) . 
Notice that most of the cells with inanimate origins show 
significant differences when compared to organic origin 
cells and that the means for the inanimate cells are lower 
than the means for the organic cells. For example, the mean 
for the cell "Plate/Inanimate Origin" (3.94) is 
significantly lower than the means for the cells 
"Bowl/Animal Origin" (5.56) and "Cup/Animal Origin" (5.50). 
These results support the information found in Figure 
4: there appears to be an overall difference between the 
subjects' plausibility ratings of the organic categories and 
the inanimate category, with the instances of the inanimate 
category ranked as less plausible precursors for the given 
dish types. 
Experiment 3: Pathway Plausibility 
Experiment 1 suggested that people perceive natural 
pathways for related invention states (such as different 
types of dishware), and Experiment 2 showed that some 
organic objects (such as parts of plants, animals, and human 
bodies) are viewed by contemporary subjects as fairly likely 
origins for some dish types. A question that remains 
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unanswered is: Are some of the dish types themselves seen 
as possible precursors to other dish types, or do the 
results of Experiment 1 merely suggest a time sequence of 
invention with little me'aningful connection between the 
separate types of dishes? In other words, did the invention 
of the plate spur the cognitive processes that led to the 
invention of the glass, or were the inventions of the plate 
and the glass separate cognitive phenomena originating from 
different sources at different times? 
Based on the modal rank.orderings for the four dish 
types--plate first, bowl second, glass third, and cup fourth 
--one might expect ,that cont.emporary subjects would see some 
ordered connections between any two of the four dishes. For 
example, since "Plate" was in the first position and "Glass" 
was in the thlrd position in the results of Experiment 1, 
the assumption could be made that a plate might be a 
precursor in the development of a glass. 
In this experiment, subjects are asked to rate (from 1 
-7) the likelihood that the change in a gi~en dish pair 
(e.g., "Plate to Glass") actually occurred in the historical 
record in the sequence shown (see Appendix E) . As stated 
above, one possible result is that higher plausibility 
ratings are given to dish pairs presented in a sequence that 
is commensurate with the rank orderings in Experiment 1 
(e.g., "Plate to Glass") and lower plausibility ratings will 
be given to pairs presented in a sequence that is opposite 
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the previous rank orderings (e.g., "Glass to Plate"). An 
alternative outcome is that the plausibility ratings given 
to different dish pairs hive no relation whatsoever to the 
perceived order of development of the two dishes comprising 
a pair. 
In order to generalize the results of the dishware 
experiment, ~a duplicate experiment with all possible pairs 
of the four digging tools presented in Experiment 1 are 
administered to a separat,e set of subjects. Here, too, one 
' ' 
possible outcome is that subjects rate tool pairs that 
follow the perceived sequence of development--scoop first, 
spade second, square shovel third, and snow shovel fourth 
--as more plausible than to~l· pairs that oppose such a 
sequence. For example, "Scoop to Square Shovel" might be 
rated a "6" or "7", indicating the subject's perception that 
such a change very likely occurred in the historical record; 
but "Square Shovel to Scoop" might be rated a "2" or "3", 
indicating that such a sequence is deemed fairly unlikely. 
Another possible outcome is that the plausibility ratings 
for the tool pairs are unrelated to the rank orderings from 
Experiment 1. 
Method 
Subjects. Thirty-three subjects for the dishware study 
and thirty-six subjects for the digging tools study were 
recruited from an introductory psychology course. They 
35 
received extra credit for their participation in this 
experiment. 
Design and Procedure. In the dishware study, the 12 
pairs of dish types were presented in a randomized order in 
a within-subjects design (see Appendix E) . Participants 
were asked to rate each pair as to the plausibility that 
dish A (e.g., a cup) actually came before dish B (e.g., a 
plate) in the historical record of dishware development. A 
Leikert-type scale from 1~7 was used. A rating of "1" 
indicated that the change fr6m dish A to dish B was very 
' ' 
UNlikely to have occurred iri that sequence. For example, 
given the results of Experiment l--in which the natural 
sequence of the four dish types was identified as plate to 
bowl to glass to cup--onemigpt expect the move from a cup to 
a plate to be rated as a "1". A rating of "7" indicated 
that the move between a given dish pair very LIKELY occurred 
in the order shown. Therefore, a move from a bowl to a cup 
might be rated a "6" o,r "7". 
Due to the fact that the dish types were presented in 
all possible permutations, each of the six dish pairs was 
presented in two diiections (e.g., "Plate to Bowl" and "Bowl 
to Plate"). Assuming that the subjects would rank one 
direction as more plausible than its 'opposite for each dish 
pair, then direction must be considered an independent 
factor so that the higher rankings for one direction do not 
cancel out the lower rankings for the opposite direction. 
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The digging tools study was a duplicate of the dishware 
' ' 
study. A separate set of subjects was randomly presented 
with the 12 possible pairs of the digging tools and asked to 
rate from 1-7 how likely a given pair actually occurred in 
the sequence shown from tool A to tool B (see Appendix F) . 
Results and Discussion. Figure 5 shows the mean 
plausibility ratings for the dish pairs by direction. In 
the figure, the six dish pairs are presented in the order 
one would expect to be most plausible based on the results 
of the rank ordering 'in E'xperiJllent 1 (e.g., plate first, 
bowl second, glass third, cup fou;rth) . These pairs are 
labeled as "Forward," and their reversals are labeled as 
"Opposite." 
Insert ·Figure 5 about here 
The hypothesis that the Forward dish pairs would be 
rated as most plausible appears to be supported only in the 
case of the "Plate to Cup" and the "Plate to Bowl" 
transitions. Otherwise, the Opposite dish pairs_ were rated 
as more plausible, which is contrary to the results expected 
from the rank orderipg given ip- Experiment 1. 
Such unexpected results could mean that while 
contemporary subjects do see the four dish types as having 
developed in a natural sequence, they do not see one dish 
type (e.g., plate) as being an actual precursor to the 
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development of another dish type (e.g., glass). Rather, 
they may see the development of the different dish types as 
unrelated other than by the timing of their invention. 
Thus, while a plate may have come before a glass in the 
historical re~ord, the invention of a plate did not spur the 
--cognitive proc~sses underlying th~ invention of a glass. 
Another possible explanation for the apparent contrast 
between the results of this expe~iment and the rank 
orderings from Experiment 1 is that the wording in the 
instructions of this exper'iment may have been too ambiguous 
(see Appendix E) . For instance~ .subjects may have 
understood the instructions to be asking them to rate the 
plausibility that dish A came·directly before dish Bin the 
historical record, that dish A actually led to the invention 
of dish B, or that it merely occurred at some point in time 
before dish B. 
Although the subjects' responses to this task differed 
in most instances from t?e expected responses given the 
results in the rank order study, there was a significant 
overall agreement between the subjects' plausibility ratings 
of the dish pairs by direction. A significant alpha 
interrater reliability coefficient was obtained for Forward 
pairs, o< = .89, and for Backward pairs, 0( = .94. 
A 2 x 6 (Direction x Dish Pair) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on both factors was performed with G~eenhouse­
Geisser corrections for departure from symmetry. A 
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significant Direction x Dish Pair interactic~ effect was 
found, £ (3.84, 122.87) = 12.78, ~ < .05. A Tukey's-HSD was 
computed in order to compare the total mean plausibility 
ratings for the twelve dish pairs (see Table 9). 
Statistically significant differences between the mean 
ratings at the q = .05 level are indicated by asterisks (*). 
Interestingly, the idea that the mean ratings would be 
significantly different for the two directions of a given 
dish pair (Forward and Opposite) was only s~p~orted for 
three of the six pairs (Plate/Glass, Bowl/C~p, and 
Plate/Bowl). 
Insert Table 9 about here 
In the digging tools study, the hypothesis that 
subjects would rate Forward tool pairs (as ~ased on the 
results of Experiment 1, with the rank ordering of scoop 
first, spade second, square shovel third, and snow shovel 
fourth) as more plausible than Opposite pa~rs was supported 
across all of the. six tool pairs (see Figure 6) . 
It is unclear why the plausibility ratings for the 
digging tool pairs are more commensurate with the rank 
orderings from Experiment 1 than are the plausibility 
ratings for the dish pairs. One possible reason might be 
that subjects viewed the digging tools as more clearly 
sequenced in a specific rank order. Looking back at Tables 
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3 an~ 4, the reader will notice that the rank orderings for 
the digging tools in Experiment 1 were more different from 
one another than were the rank orderings for the dish types. 
Thus, it is possible that subjects in this experiment showed 
less ambivalence regard~ng the sequence of the digging tools 
when giving their plausibility ratings than they did 
regarding the sequence of the dish types .. 
The instructions for the dishware and the digging tools 
studies were exactly the same, except for the terms used for 
dish types and tools (see Appe~dixes E and F) . This fact 
does not support the proposed explanation that the ambiguity 
of the instructions in the dishware study accounted for the 
unexpected results (specifically, that· most Forward dish 
pairs were not rated, as more plausible than their 
Opposites). Th~ same instructions, when used for the 
digging tools study, resulte~ in subjects rating most 
Forward tool pairs as more plausible than their Opposites. 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
Not only did·the ratings in the digging tools study 
seem to support the rank ordering results from Experiment 1, 
but the subjects in this study also highly agreed in their 
ratings of the tool changes. An alpha coefficient of 
interrater reliability was performed for each direction 
across the six tool pairs. Statistically significant 
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agreement between the subjects' plausibility ratings was 
found for both Forward tool pairs, ex = .94, and their 
Opposites, CX = .97. 
A 2 x 6 (Direction x Digging Tool) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on both factors was performed with Greenhouse-
Geisser corrections for departure from symmetry. A 
significant Direction x Tool Pair interaction effect was 
found, £ (3.38, 118.30) = 25;68, ~ < .05. In order to 
compare the mean plausibility ratings of the twelve total 
tool transitions, a Tukey's-HSD was performed. Table 10 
indicates with an a~terisk (*) which transitions were 
significantly different from one another at the q = .05 
level. Notice that four of the six tool pairs were 
significantly different from their reversals (Scoop/Snow, 
Scoop/Square, Spade/Snow, and Scoop/Spade), which lends 
further support to the notion that contemporary subjects do 
view some pathways between related invention states as more 
plausible than others. 
Insert Table 10 about here 
Note also that most. of the statistically significant 
differences between the tool transitions occurred where the 
Scoop placed in the last position (e.g., "Snow Shovel to 
' Scoop" and "Square Shovel to Scoop") was compared with any 
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other tool transition. This makes common sense given the 
results of Experiment 1 in...w.hich the Scoop was clearly 
judged to have come firs~. Subjects in this study appear to 
have agreed with that finding, because when the Scoop was 
presented as coming after another tool in a pair, that pair 
was rated as fairly implausible (also see Figure 6) . 
Experiment 4: Motivating Fa,ctors 
The results of Experiment 1 showed that contemporary 
people perceive a natural seq-y.ence to the invention pathways 
of dishware and digging tools. This experiment searches for 
perceptions of possible motivating factors in taking steps 
along an inyention path. Subjects are asked to rate the 
plausibility that certain food consistencies (solid/liquid) 
and food temperatures (hot/cold) motivated the changes 
between given pairs of dishes (e~g., changes from a plate to 
a bowl) . A likely outcome i~ that some types of food are 
rated as more motivating in some dish transformations than 
in others. For example, hot liquids will probably be rated 
as a likely reason for changing from a plate to a bowl or ac 
cup. Such a result would lend a functional explanation for 
' 
the moves between dish types; the function that the dish is 
required to perform helps to shape the form that the dish 
will take. Note again that a strong historical claim is not 
being made. Instead, it is the subjects' perceptions that 
are examined. 
Method 
Subjects. Thirty-~ine subjects from an introductory 
psychology course ·were given extra credit for thie 
participation in this experiment. 
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Design and Procedure. Subjects were given a paper and 
pencil task in which they were asked to rate the likelihood 
that the need to contain certain food types motivated the 
changes between a pair of different dish types (see Appendix 
G). All possible pairs (12 permutations) of the four dish 
types were presented randomly within-subjects._ Participants 
were also presented four food types {hot liquid, hot solid, 
cold liquid, cold solid) in a random, within-subjects 
format. 
The task involved rating each of the ,four food types as 
to how likely it motivat,ed the change ·in dish form from A to 
B {e.g., from a plate to aglass). A rating of "1" indicated 
that the food type was a very UNlikely motivating factor in 
the move from dish A to dish B. For example, a "hot solid" 
might be rated a "1" as a very UNlikely motivator for the 
change from a pl~te to a glass. In other words, there is 
little need to change froma plate to a.glass in order to 
accommodate a hot solid, such as a hot piece of meat. A 
rating of "7" indicated that the food type was a very LIKELY 
factor in the change from dish A to dish B. In moving from 
a plate to a glass, a cold liquid (e.g., iced tea) might be 
rated a "7". 
43 
Results and Discussion. For each of the twelve dish 
pairs, a separate 2 x 2 (Food Consistency x Food 
Temperature) ANOVA with repeated measures on both factors 
was performed. The results of the 12 ANOVAs are listed in 
Table 11. The reader will notice that for the dish pair 
.. "Glass to Plate" the mean ratings for the solid foods (both 
at 5.26) are definitely higher than those for liquids (at 
1.15 and 1.18). Also, a statistically significant main 
effect for Food Consistency was found, E (5.4, 38) = 120.66, 
~ < .01. This strongly suggests that subjects saw the need 
to contain a solid food, regardless of its temperature, as a 
likely motivating factor in changing a glass to a plate. 
Insert Table 11 about here 
While this result makes common sense based on the 
structural features of a glass and a plate (e.g., solids 
would be very difficult to eat from a glass), note that the 
claim that a glass actually came before the plate in the 
historical record is not being made here. Rather, it is the 
perception of the motivation underlying the presented 
transitions that is at issue here. 
For "Glass to Bowl," a significant main effect for 
Food Temperature was found, E (3.1, 38) = 19.28, ~ < .01. 
The mean ratings for "Glass to Bowl" (found in Table 11) 
indicate that hot food, regardless of its consistency, was 
judged to be a more likely motivator than cold food in the 
move between a glass and a bowl. 
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Significant Temperature x Consistency interaction 
effects were found for the remaining dish pairs at the ~ < 
.05 level (i~dicated in Table 11 with asterisks). Although 
not interpretable due to significant interactioneffects, 
some main effects were considered interesting and are 
therefore marked with a carat (A) in Table 11. For example, 
"Plate to Bowl" showed a suggestive main effect for Food 
Temperature and "Bowl to Plate" showed a suggestive main 
effect for Food Consistency. A Tukey's-HSD was performed 
for both of these transitions in order to compare the mean 
ratings. 
Table 12 shows the results of the multiple comparisons 
of the mean ratings for dish pairs "Plate to Bowl" (as 
indicated by an ~sterisk) and "Bowl to Plate" (as indicated 
by a cross)< For "Plate to Bowl, " the statistically 
significant differences at the q = .05 level were between 
the hot foods and the colO. foods. In looking back at Table 
11, notice that fo~ "Plate to Bowl" the mean plausibility 
ratings were higher fo~ hot foods than. for cold foods. This 
suggests that subjects viewed. hot food as a more likely 
motivator than cold food in the change from a plate to a 
bowl. 
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Insert Table 12 about here 
For the reversal of that dish pair, "Bowl to Plate," 
Food Consistency seemed to be a more motivating factor in 
the transition. Table 12 shows that all of the differences 
l 
between the mean ratings for the solid and liquid foods were 
statistically significant at the q = .05 level. The means 
shown for "Bowl to Plate" in Table 11 in~icate that subjects 
judged solid food as a more likely motivating factor than 
liquids in the transition between the dish types. 
Suggestive, though not interpretable, main effects for 
Food Consistency were also found for both the "Plate to Cup" 
and "Cup to Plate" transitions. Again, a Tukey's-HSD was 
used to compare the mean ratings for these dish pairs. 
Table 13 shows that for both "Plate to Cupn (as indicated 
with an asterisk) and "Cup to Plate" (indicated with a 
cross) the differen6es betwe~n all of the mean plausibility 
ratings for solids and liquids were statistically 
significant and the ~ = .05 level. 
Insert Table. 13 about here 
For "Plate to Cup," the mean ratings found in Tabl~ 11 
suggest that the need to contain liquids was judged to be 
the more likely motivating factor in the transition. For 
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"Cup to Plate," the mean ratings for solids were higher than 
for liquids, indicating that containment of solid food was a 
more plausible motivator in the change between the dish 
pair. 
Experiment 5: Heuristics 
The preceding experiments show that people do think of 
related inventions as linked in a sequential nature with 
common origins and that the function needed to be performed 
is seen as a strongly motivating .factor in the development 
of a given invention. The next step, which is to be 
addressed in this experiment, is to test the subjects' 
knowledge of some simple rules used in moving from one dish 
type to another. For example, when moving from a plate to a 
cup with a handle, what changes must be made? The.diameter 
is decreased, depth is added, and a handle is added. 
Although these changes may seem obvious to most contemporary 
adults, at some point in the historical record they may not 
have seemed so obvious. The historical database shows that 
plates, bowls, cups, and glasses were not all invented at 
the same time (Scott, 1954), so at some point 1n human 
development the idea to add or decrease diameter, depth, 
and/or handles was not glaringly-obvious. 
In this experiment, the probable outcome is that there 
is substantial agreement between subjects as to what 
heuristics were used in the steps moving from dish A to dish 
B. An alternative outcome, however, is thatthere is little 
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agreement on what heuristics are involved in a given 
transition pair. If this is the case, then the idea that a 
given invention can be arrived at thrbugh following 
heuristic rules is not supported by subjects' perceptions. 
However, if there is consistent agreement on the heuristics 
used, then it is likely that those heuristics may 'have been 
powerful ones for a given transition. 
In order to generalize·~he observable power and 
' ' 
usefulness of basic heuristics us~d in the transformation of 
one invention state into another, a separate set of subjects ., 
are also asked to identify wh~t heuristic rules, if any, 
were used to transform one type of digging tool to another. 
If subjects agree on the heurist~cs involved in moving 
between a given tool pair, then the outcome would lend 
further power and credibility to the idea that simple "rules 
•' 
of thumb" may be applied to make changes among members of an 
invention family, ·whether dishware or digging tools. 
Method 
Subjects. All subjects were recruited from an 
int~oductory psychology course, in which they received extra 
credit for their participation in this experiment. Twenty 
-eight subjects were .involved in the dishware ·study, and 
forty subjects participated in the digging tool study. 
Design and Procedure. In the dishware study, subjects 
were given a paper and pencil task which instructed them to 
write down all possible steps in moving between two dish 
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types (see Appendix H) . All possible pairs (12 
permutations) of the four dish types used in the preceding 
experiments were presented within-subjects in a random 
order. 
The subjects' responses for each dish pair were 
categorized by "type of heuristic" by two separate judges. 
" ' 
A percentage of agreement between the judges was then 
calculated for each heuristic across all 12 dish pairs. 
The digging tools s~udy was a duplicate of the dishware 
experiment in order to search,. for possible common heuristics 
used in the two different invention categories (see Appendix 
I) . Here a separate set of subjects wasgiven the 12 
possible pairs of the four di~ging tools used in Experiment 
1 and asked to identify the changes when, moving between each 
pair. Again, two judges categorized the heuristics for each 
tool pair, and a percentage of agreement between the judges 
was calculated for each heuristic across all tool pairs. 
Results and Discussion. For the dishware study, the_ 
heuristic rules given by subjects across all of the dish 
pairs are shown in Table 14. The percentage of subjects 
reporting each rule for a given dish pair ~~ shown. For 
example~ for the dish pair "P~ate to Bowl," 79% of the 
subjects reported that height was increased, 7% stated 
diameter increased, 54% noted diameter decreased, 7% saw a 
decrease in the lip or rim, and 18% gave miscellaneous 
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heuristics. Note that not all of the rules shown in the 
table are applicable for each dish-pair. 
Insert.Table 14 about here 
According to the resul,ts of Table 14, · the' heuristic 
rules of increasing or:decreasing height and/or di~meter and 
adding 6r del~ting a handle are-recognizable to_ the majority 
of subjects, as suggested by' relatively high percentages of 
subjects reporting'these heurist{cs (when applicable for a 
dish pair) . Some responses, included under "Enlarge" and 
"Condense," seemed to indic~~e a change in height and/or 
) ''. 
diameter, yet were not recorded under the rules 
"Increase/Decrease Height'' or "Increase/Decrease 
Diameter" due to lack· .of specificity. For example, a 
response of "make it larger" might mean to increase height 
or diameter or both; thus, it was judged to fit under the 
more ambiguous classification of "Enlarge." 
To establish reliability, two judges separately 
' .. 
classified subjects' responses for each dish pair by type of 
heuristic. The percentage of agreement between the judges' 
groupings across·dish pairs was at or above 75% for all 
heuristics, except for·Delete Lip (33% agreement) and. 
Straighten Edges (0% agreement) . Those heuristics which 
have low percentages of agreement between the judges have 
low overall frequencyof responses from the subjects, and a 
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single disagreement substantially reduces reliability. 
These reliabilities are not as high as one likes; but given 
that they are based on the free-form written responses of 
naive subjects, they are respectable. 
Table 15 shows the percentage of subjects reporting 
different heuristic rules in the digging tools study. 
' , 
Several more heuristic ~ules were reported overall for the 
digging tools as compared to the number of rules given for 
the dishware, possibly due to the complexity and the more 
ambiguous nature of the digging .tool drawings. Here again, 
some generalresponses (e.g._, "enla;rge the scoop," "make it 
smaller," -.or "curve/deepen it.") seeme<;i to suggest changes in 
height and/or width, but wer~ not specific enough to be 
included in the increase/decrease height or width 
categories. 
Insert Table 15 about here 
The percentage of agreement between the two judges' 
groupings of the heuristics acros~ tool pairs w~s at or 
above 83% for all heuristics, except for Increase Blade (0% 
agreement) , Decrease Blade ( 60% agreement) ,. and Increase 
Height (0% agreement) . The heuristic categories with low 
agreement between the judges all have low frequencies of 
responses from the subjects, and again a single disagreement 
drastically lowers reliability. 
The percentages of subjects reporting changes in the 
handle and/or the shaft of the tool pairs were relatively 
high. Changes in the width and/or the shape of the Blade 
(especially making it square or curved) were also highly 
reported. 
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These results, coupled with the results of'the dishware 
study, suggest that certain heuristic rules (such as add or 
delete a handle, increase or decrease width) are 
generalizable across different types of inventions. Some 
heuristics that were highly reported in one study but not in 
the other study (such as increase/decrease height in 
dishware or make changes in the shaft of the digging tools) 
were probably related in part to the different structures of 
the two invention types. This is not to say, however, that 
such heuristics are not generalizable to other invention 
types. 
The heuristic rule of "increase or decrease height" in 
order to make changes a~ong related inventions is often 
used. Consider the developme~t of architectural structures, 
which have progressively become taller, resulting in the 
modern high-rise· dwellings and skyscraper office buildings. 
Another variation of a living-space structure which makes 
use of the increase/decrease height heuristic is the camping 
trailer that folds down for easy transportation and pops up 
when in use. Of course, these are complex examples that 
involve much more than simple height or size changes, but 
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\ 
they do illustrate how simple heuristics can be generalized 
to make changes in complex inventions. 
Making changes in the shaft of related inventions other 
than digging tools is also seen, as in the differences 
between upright vacuums with a long shaft and hand-held 
vacuums with a short shaft. The invention pathways of other 
related artifacts also suggest the use of the heuristic 
"change the width and/or shap~" of a part similar to a 
blade. For example, inventions which involve lenses (such 
as cameras, eyeglasses, contacts, microscopes, etc) often 
differ from one another mainly by the curve and/or diameter 
of the lens involved. Although this .is obviously not the 
only heuristic used in moving between such inventions, it is 
certainly an important one. Also, because such heuristics 
give rise to infinite possible variations, other 
requirements such as purpose,arid evaluation must come into 
play. 
Conclusion 
The quasi-historical approach to the study of the 
perceptions of contemporary peopl.e regarding invention .is 
certainly a usef~l one. By utilizing an already existing 
databse of artifacts, researchers may continue to gain an 
understanding of how modern people view related inventions. 
Such contemporary viewpoints may or may not differ from the 
actual historical record of inventions. More importantly, 
present-day subjects' responses to invention studies open a 
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window into the thought processes that may be used to change 
and improve upon inventions. From this information, 
psychologists gain a conceptual organization of the 
inventive process. 
The strong agreement between subjects' perceptions in 
the preceding experiments is so compelling that it sheds 
light on the way humans think about the creative process. 
' These results suggest the follow-ing concepts about human 
perceptions regarding the process of invention: 
1) People think of some related inventions as linked in 
sequential t.ime-lines, or natural pathways. A common way of 
viewing such pathways is that they progr,ess from simple 
artifacts to inventions of increasing complexity. 
2) Contemporary- people see organic origins (such as 
parts of plants, animals, or human bodies),as more plausible 
than inanimate origins (such as rock formations) for some 
simple, early invent_ions. Subjects may also view a simple 
invention (such as a scoop) as an actual precursor in the 
development, of a later, more complex invention'_ (such as a 
spade) . 
3) The function that a new·artifact is to serve is seen 
as a motivating factor behin~ its inv~ntion. , For example, 
subjects viewed the need to contain liquids as having 
spurred the development of particular dish types, such as a 
bowl and a glass. 
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4) In the changebetween two related inventions, some 
heuristics, or "rules of thumb," are readily recognizable. 
These heuristcs, such as "increase the 6eight" of a given 
artifact in order to make a new one, may be generalizable to 
other classes df inventions. In this study, similar 
heuristics were reported for the changes between different 
types of dishware and for different digging tools. 
Possible future steps in.the study of perceptions of 
the process of invention may include: 1) Research into the 
life-span development of the psychological processes 
underlying invention, involving comparative studies with 
children, adolescents, and adults as subject'groups, and 2) 
studies involving subject populations from different 
cultures and genders, to note similarities and variations in 
thinking about inventions and heuristics. 
The study of the inventive process not only allows 
psychologists to research probelm-solving and creativity in 
a more concrete, applicable way than usually undertaken, it 
also places the cognitive sciences in a uniquely important 
interactive relationship with the world of technology. 
Psychologists can make u~e of the products of technology to 
learn more about the cognitive pr6cesses that underlie 
inventions. As our knowledge base regarding inventiveness 
grows, psychologis~s might ~hen provide information to the 
public that may aid in the invention of new products. Such 
information could poss~bly result in: 1) a larger number of 
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people inventing new artifiacts, 2) higher efficiency and 
more rapid progress inthe development of inventions, and/or 
3) higher overall quality and quantity of inventions. Thus, 
the field of cognitive psychology, together with technology 
and business, would be an important information source for 
people interested in producing inventive ideas. 
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Appendix A 
Experiment 1 (Dishware) 
Shown below are four type~~f dishware. On the line below 
each picture, indicate by numbering 1 through 4 which dish 
type was invented first, second, third, and fourth. Give a 
brief explanation for your ranking below. 
0 
Why did you think your number 1 was invented first? 
Why did you think your number 2 was invented second? 
Why did you think your number 3 was invented third? 
Why did you think your number 4 was invented fourth? 
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Appendix B 
Experiment 1 <Pigging Tools) 
Shown below are four types of digging tools. On the line 
below each picture, indicate by numbering 1 through 4 which 
digging tool was invented first, second, third, and fourth. 
Give a brief explanation for your ranking below. 
Why did you think your number 1 was invented first? 
Why did you think your number 2 was invented second? 
Why did you think your number 3 was invented third? 
Why did you think your number 4 was invented fourth? 
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Appendix C 
~riment 2 (Part A) 
Four different types of dishes are shown below. Underneath 
each dish type are four categories of things that may have 
come before each dish in its development (A,B,C, and D). 
For each dish type, write down as many instances as you can 
of things in each category that may have been forerunners in 
the development of that dish. 
I. L1J 
A. Animal Parts 
B. Inanimate Forms 
c. Plant Parts 
D. Human Body Parts 
II. u 
A. Human Body Parts 
B. Plant Parts 
c. Animal Parts 
D. Inanimate Forms 
III. ~ 
A. Plant Parts 
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B. Inanimate Forms 
C. Human Body Parts 
D. Animal Parts 
IV. 0 
A. Inanimate Forms 
B. Plant Parts 
C. Human Body Parts 
D. Animal Parts 
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Appendix D 
Experiment 2 (Part B) 
Four different types of dishes are shown on the left-hand 
side of the next page. To the right or each dish type, four 
things are listed which may or may not have come before in 
the development of each dish (e.g., rock, leaf, etc.). Your 
task is to rate each possible forerunner as to how likely it 
is that it carne before the given dish type in the ·historical 
record. A rating of "1" means that the thing was ver~ 
UNlikely to be found in the historical record of the given 
dish type. A rating of "7" means that the thing was very 
LIKELY a forerunner in the development of the dish type. If-
a thing is somewhere between very UNlikely at all and very 
LIKELY, then you would fill in a middle range number between 
"1" and "7". 
For example, for the following dish type: 
you might rate a flat rock as a "1" or "2" to indicate that 
it was very UNlikely a forerunner in the dish type's 
development. However, a hdllow tree trunk might be rated as 
a "5" or "6" to indicate that it was LIKELY a forerunner for 
this dish type. 
Remember, the rating scale: "1" is very UNlikley 
"7" is very LIKELY 
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DISH POSSIBLE 






d. animal paws 
2. 0 a. rock b. animal paws 
c. hands 












Experiment 3 CDishware> 
Listed on page 2 are pos~ible changes 
dishware to another, srich as changing 
the example at the top of the table. 
may not have actually occurred in the 
different types.of dishware. · 
from one type of 
Dish A to Dish B in 
These changes may or 
development of 
In the space to the right of each possible change, please 
rate how likely it is that this change actually occurred in 
this sequence in the historical record of dishware 
de~elopment. A rating of "1 1' means that the change is very 
UNlikely to be found in the historical record. A rating of 
"7" means that the change very LIKELY occurred in history in 
the sequence shown. If a change between dish types is 
somewhere between very UNlikely at all and very LIKELY, then 
you would fill in a middle range number between "1" and "7". 
For example, in moving from .Dish A to Dish B: 
you might rate this change.a~ a "1" or a "2" to indicate 
that Dish B was very UNlikely to follow the development of 
Dish A in history. 
Remember, the rating scale: "1" is very UNlikely 









(l=very UNlikely, 7=very LIKELY) 
' ~-~ ,,, ' 
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Appendix F 
Experiment 3 (Digging Tools) 
Listed on page 2 are possible changes from one type of 
digging tool to another, such as ~h~nging Tool A to Tool B 
in the example at the top of the table. These changes may 
or may not have actually occurred in the development of 
different types of digging t'ools. · 
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In the space to the right of each possible change, please 
rate how likely it is that this change actually occurred in 
this sequence in the historical record of digging tool 
development. A rating of "1" means that the change is very 
UNlikely-to be found in the historical record. A rating of 
"7" means that the change very LIKELY occurred in history in 
the sequence shown. If a change b£tween tool types is 
somewhere between very UNlikely at all and very LIKELY, then 
you would fill in a middle ~ange number between "1" and "7". 
For example, in moving from Tool A to Tool B: 
you might rate this change as a "4" or a "5" to indicate 
that Tool B was moderately likely to follow the development 
of Tool A in history. 
Remember, the rating scale: "1" is very UNlikely 
"7" is very LIKELY 
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Tool Change Rating 
A. B. 
(l=very UNlikely, 7=very LIKELY) 
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Tool Change Rating 
A. B. 
(l=very UNlikely, 7=very LIKELY) 
----------------------..,....-----
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Experiment 4 
On the left side of the table on page 2 are possible dish 
changes from one type of-~ishware to another, such as 
changing Dish A to Dish B in the example at the top of the 
table. These changes may or may not have actually occ~rred 
in the development of different types of dishware. 
On the right side of the table are four different types of 
food: hot/liquid (such as coffee), cold solid (such as a 
cold piece of meat), hot/solid (such as a steamed 
vegetable)·, and cold/liquid (such as an· iced beverage). 
Please rate for each'possible dish change how likely it is 
that each type of food motivated the change from the first 
dish in the pair to the second. A rating of 11 1 11 means that 
the food type was a very UNlikely motivating factor in the 
change from the first dish type to the second. A rating of 
11 7 11 means that the. food type was very LIKELY· a, motivating 
factor in the change. If a food type is somewhere between 
very UNlikely at all and ye~y LIKELY, then you would fill in 
a middle range number between 11 1 11 and' 11 7 11 • 
In the example figure at th~ top of the table, the change is 
from Dish A to Dish ~: 
As noted in the table, you might give a rating of 11 1 11 to 
indicate that it is very UNlikely that a cold/liquid 
motivated the change from Dish A to Dish B. However, you 
might give a very high rating, a 11 6 11 or "7", for the 
cold/solid food type. 
Remember, the rating scale: "1" is very UNlikely 
"7" is very LIKELY 
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Food Type 
Dish Change Hot/ Cold/ Hot/ Cold/ 
'Liquid Solid Liquid Liquid 
(like (like (like (like 
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' c=s ~EJJ 
~~ 
0 ~ u 




Dish Change Hot/ Cold/ Hot/ Cold/ 
Liquid Solid Liquid Liquid 
(like (like (like (like 
coffee) cold ·meat) steamed iced 
vegetable) beverage) 
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Appendix H 
Experiment 5 (Dishwarel 
On the left side of the page below are possible changes from 
one type of dishware to another, such as the change from 
Dish A to Dish B. These changes may or may not have 
actually occurred in the development of different types of 
dishware. 
You are an inventor who wants to change Dish A to Dish B. 
In the space to the right of each pair of dish types, write 
down as many steps as you can think of in order,to move from 










Experiment 5 (Digging Tools) 
On the left side of the page below a~e possible changes from 
one type of digging tool to another, such as the change from 
Tool A to Tool B. These changes may or may not have 
actually occurred in, the development of different types of 
digging tools. 
You are an inventor who wants to change Tool A to Tool B. 
In the space to the right of each pair of tools, write down 
as many steps as you can,think of in order to move from Tool 







Frame Structure for a Cup with a Handle 
Slot names have the irtitial letter capitalized ~nd they 
are italicized; values·are in lowercase. 
Superordinat~ category: :, container; dishware. 
General purpose/function: to hold liquids; to keep hands 
from getting burned or mess¥; manners in drinking. 
79 
Physical principles: contai~ment; lever action with handle 
to add ease in pouring; safety in physically separating 
hot surface from hand. 
Specializations: measuring cup. 
Related invention~: 'bowl; drinking glass~ pitcher. 
~: high, to contain liquids; for sanitation; to avoid 
messiness; to avoid 
burn~ng hands. 
Global evaluation: effective for drinking Fequirements. 
(table continues) 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
"cup" 
Parts Analysis (slots along the top of the table 
and values in the body) 
Material Evaluation 
ceramic, metal, glass good for liquids; 
not as effective 
for some solid 
foods (difficult 
to reach food 
with a knife) 
handle ceramic, metal, glass effective for 
prevention of 
burning, but can 
break off 
Precursor inventionS: cupped hand, half shell, animal 
' ; 
stomach '(?) 
Successor inventions: disposable plastic cups; cups with 
lids for no-spill traveling 
Table 2 
Frame Structure of a Theoretical Res~aurant Script 
(Adapted from Schank & Abelson, 1977l 
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Slot names have the initial l~tter _capi~alized and they 












customer has money 
customer has less money 
owner has more money , 








Table 2 (Continued) 
Frame Structure of a Theoretical Restaurant Script 
Scene 1 - Entering: customer enters restaurant 
customer looks for table 
customer decides where to sit 
customer goes to table 
customer sits down 
Scene 2 - Ordering: customer picks up menu 
customer looks at menu 
customer decides on food 
customer signals waitress 
waitress comes to table 
customer orders food 
waitress goes to cook 
Scene 3 - Eating: 
Scene 4 - Exiting: 
waitress gives food order to cook 
cook prepares food 
cook gives food to waitress 
waitress brings food to customer 
customer eats food 
waitress writes bill 
waitress goes over to customer 
waitress gives bill to customer 
customer gives tip to waitress 
customer goes to cashier 
customer gives money to cashier 
customer leaves restaurant 
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Table 3: Experiment 1 





























Table 4: Experiment 1 





























Table 5: Experiment 1 
Fre~uency of First Type of Reason Given for 
Rank Order #1 (Dishwarel 
85 
Type of 
Reason Observed *Expected *Residual 
Simplest 16 5.14 10.86 
Specific Use 7 5.14 
Flattest 5 5.14 
Most Natural 3 5.14 -
Most Universal 3 5.14 -
Most Portable 1 5.14 -
Miscellaneous 1 5.14 -
N = 36 Subjects. 
*Note: Expected frequency is based on the chi-square 
assumption that frequencies will be the same across all 
types of reasons. Residual refers to the differences 








Table 6: Experiment 1 
FreQuency of First Type of Reason Given for Rank Order #1 
Wigging Tools l 
Type of 
Reason Observed *Expected *Residual 
Most Primitive 14 7.60 
Simplest 13 7.60 
Most Natural 5 7.60 
Miscellaneous 4 7.60 
Specific Use 2 7.60 
N = 38 Subjects. 
*Note: Expected frequency is based on the chi-square 
assumption that frequencies will be the same across all 
types of reasons. Residual refers to the differences 






Table 7: Experiment 2, Part A 
Tykey's Myltlple Comoar!sons of Mean Fragyency of Besoonsa for Possible Origins 
Dish/Origin Dish/Origin 
Means 
Glass Plate Bowl Glass Plate Cup Cup Plate Bowl Glas1 Bowl Cup Bow Plate Plate Glasa Cup Cup Bow Glase 
Plant Human Ani"' ........... Plan Plan Anlm Anlm Plan Anlrr H""""" ~ ......... I nan Mise I nan Mise I nan Mise Mise I nan 
1.71 1.66 1.61 1.47 1.45 1.40 1.37 1.37 1.32 1.29 1.29 1.13 0.82 0.79 0.76 0.63 0.63 0.58 0.58 0.45 
Glau/Piant • . • . . • . . . 
Plate/Human . . • . . . . . 
Bowl/An 1m . • . . . . . . 
Glass/Human • . . . . . . . 
Plate/Plant . . . . . . . . 
Cup/Plant . . • . . . . • 
Cup/Animal . . . . . . . . 
Plate/Anlm . . . . • . . . 
Bowl/Plant • • . • . . 
Glau/Anim • . . . . 
Bowl/Human . • . . . 
Cup/Human . . . 








N • 38 Subjects 
• • etatistlcally significant difference; q • .05 . for all teats 
Table 8: Experiment 2, Part B 
Tukey's Myltlple Comparisons of Mean Plays!blllty Ratings U-7) for Possible Origins 
Dish/Origin Dish/Origin 
Means 
Bowl CUp Cup Plate Bowl Glass Glass Plate Plate Plate Bowl Cup Bowl Glass 
Anlm Anlm Human Human Human Plant Human Plant I nan Anlm Plant Plant In an Anlm 
5.56 5.50 5.25 5.03 4.86 4.64 4.47 4.47 3.94 2.94 2.94 2.78 2.64 2.50 
Bowl/Animal .,. . . . .,. • 
Cup/Animal .,. . . . .,. • 
Cup/Human . . . .,. . 
Plate/Human . . . .,. . 
Bowl/Human . . . .,. . 
Glass/Plant • . . .,. . 
Glass/Human . . . .,. . 
Plate/Plant . . . .,. • 
Plate/lnan 







N • 36 Subjects 
• .. statistically significant difference; q .. .05 for all tests 

























Table 9: Experiment 3 (Oishware) 
Jjlk'l)''s MulliPia Comparisons of Mean Playslblllty Ratings (1-7) fpr Dish Pairs 
Dish Pairs Dish Pairs 
Means 
Cup- Plate- Bowl- Plate- Bowl- Glass- Glass- Bowl- Glass- Cup- Cup- Plate· 
Plate Glass Cup Cup Glass Plata Cup Plate Bowl Glass Bowl Bowl 
1.94 2.21 2.24 2.67 3.64 3.73 4.03 4.03 4.21 4.85 4.85 5.58 I 
Cup-Plate . . . . . . . . 
Plate-Glass . .,. . . . . • . 
Bowl-Cup . . . . . .,. . 









N • 33 Subjects 
• • statistically significant dlflerence; q • .05 for all tests 
" • significant difference between the two directions of a dish pair 
Table 10: Experiment 3 (Digging Tools) 
Juke,y's MultiRJJ Comparisons of Mean Plausibility Ratings ll-7) for Digging Tool Pairs 
Tool Pairs Tool Pairs 
Means 
Snow- Square- Spada- Snow- Scoop- Square- Snow- Scoop-
Sooop Scoop Scoop Spade Snow Spade SQuare SQuare 
1.42 1.53 2.00 3.22 4.00 4.39 4.44 4.47 
Snow-Scoop . ... . • . 
Square-Scoop . . . . ... 











N • 36 Subjects 
• • statistically significant difference; q • .05 for all tests 




• • . ,. 
• • ... . 
Scoop-
Spade 




5.81 I . . . 
• . . 
1.0 
0 
Table 11: Experiment 4 
2 x 2 (Food Consistency x Food Temperature) ANOVAs for 12 Dish Pairs 
Dish Pair Means for Consistency/Temperature Combinations Consistency Temperature Consistency x 
Temperature 
Hot/LIQuid Hot/Solid Cold/LIQuid Cold/Solid F p F p F p 
Glass-Plate 1.15 5.26 1.18 5.26 120.66- .01 .01 .93 .01 .91 
Glass-Bowl 3.51 4.31 2.33 3.03 2.78 .10 19.28- .01 .06 .81 
Plate-Bowl 3.64 4.28 3.13 2.85 .13 .72 19.69" .01 6.42. .02 
Bowl-Plate 1.56 4.92 1.26 5.51 117.54" .01 .69 .41 7.98" .01 
Plate-Cup 5.46 1.92 4.31 1.87 30.92" .01 6.52 .15 11.01" .01 
Cup-Plate 1.41 5.18 1.10 5.62 149.08" .01 .23 . 63 4.47 • .04 
Cup-Glass 3.15 1.39 5.72 1.15 119.21 .01 34.38 .01 33.42. .01 
Glass-Cup 5.95 2.00 3.18 1.46 58.70 .01 46.02 .01 22.15" .01 
Bowl-Cup 5.80 1.69 3.64 1.41 62.79 .01 59.58 .01 24.22" .01 
Cup-Bowl 2.90 4.49 2.49 2.80 4.14 .05 21.30 .01 6.84" .01 
Bowl-Glass 4.05 1.21 5.90 1.21 226.58 .01 27.59 .01 24.39" .01 
Plate-Glass 3.87 1.62 5.97 1.23 84.05 . 01 31.27 .01 40.61 • .01 
N • 39 Subjects 
• • Consistency x Temperature interaction effects significant at p<.05 level 
- = interpretable significant main effects at p<.05 level 
" • Interesting significant main effects that are not interpretable due to significant Interaction effects 
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Table 12: Experiment 4 
Tukey's-HSD Multiple Comparisons of. Mean Plausibility 
Ratings {1-7) for Food Temperature & Consistency: 



















* statistically significan~ difference for "Plate to Bowl" 
+ statistically significant difference for "Bowl to Plate" 
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Table 13: Experiment 4 
Tukey's-HSD Multiple Comparisons of Mean Plausibility 
Ratin~s (1-7) for Food Temperature & Consistency: 



















* statistically significant difference for "Plate to Cup" 
+ statistically significant difference for "Cup to Plate" 
Table 14: Experiment 5 (Dishware) 
Percentage of Subjects Reporting Heuristic Rules for Each Dish Pair 
Dish Pair 
Plate-Bowl 7 
Plate-Cup 86 82 
Plate-Glass 86 75 4 
Bowl-Plate 100 71 18 
Bowl-Cup 29 32 82 
Bowl-Glass 89 82 
Cup-Plate 96 75 57 18 
Cup-Bowl 18 71 71 
Cup-Glass 86 4 21 82 
Glass-Plate 93 75 18 
Glass-Bowl 79 96 
Glass-Cu 100 10 96 













NOTE: Subjects were asked to report as many heuristic rules as possible, so percentages across rules for 
each dish pair will not add ,to 100. Percentages were rounded up to the nearest whole number. 
Table 15: Experiment 5 (Digging Tools) 
Percentage of Subjects Reporting Heuristic Rules for Each Digging Tool Pair 
Tool Pair 
Sccoop-Spad 
Scoop-Squar 95 20 50 58 
Scoop-Snow 30 98 70 25 35 60 
Spade-Scoop 95 13 70 8 
Spade-Squar 10 98 13 8 70 3 8 
Spade-Snow 3 63 90 35 20 '60 
Square-Scoo 23 93 55 8 65 13 
Square-Spad 93 13 3 80 
Square-Snow 8 73 18 33 20 
Snow-Scoop 45 95 58 8 73 13 
Snow-Spade 40 90 35 10 78 
Snow-S uare 3 - 63 38 30 38 '3 
N = 40 subjects 
NOTE: Subjects were asked to report as many heuristic rules as possible, so percentages· across rules for 
















Figure 1. Necessary transformations between a plate and a 
bowl (+ indicates the presence of a characteristic, 











Figure 2. Possible transformations between a square shovel 
and a snow shovel (* indicates the presence of a 
characteristic, + indicates an increase in the 




Feature Shovel Shovel 
scoop width * + 
scoop height * 0 
shaft length * + 
handle width * + 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 3. Experiment 2, Part A: Mean frequency of response 


























Human Animal Plant Inanimate Misc. 
Origin Category 
Figure Caption 
Figure 4. Experiment 2, Part B: Mean plausibility ratings 
(1-7) for dish types by origin category (N = 36 subjects). 
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Figure 5. Experiment 3 (Dishware): Mean plausibility 
ratings (1-7) for dish pairs by direction ("Forward" pairs 
are derived from the rank orderings from Experiment 1, with 
plate first, bowl second, glass third, and cup fourth. 
"Opposite" pairs are the reversals of forward pairs. N 33 
subjects) . 








Figure 6. Experiment 3 (Digging Tools) 
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Mean plausibility 
ratings (1-7) for tool pairs by direction ("Forward" pairs 
are derived from the rank orderings from Experiment 1, with 
scoop first, spade second, square shovel third, and snow 
shovel fourth. "Opposite" pairs are the reversals of 
forward pairs. N = 36 subjects). 
Mean Plausibility Ratings 
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